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Social representations: A normative and dynamic intergroup approach 
The target article by Elcheroth, Doise and Reicher presents an ambitious, comprehensive 
and convincing overview of many of the epistemological assumptions of a social representations 
approach to political knowledge. In this commentary, we would first like to point out a number of 
issues which relate to their conceptualization of shared knowledge and to the implications of their 
approach for studying diversity and contestation. In response to their analysis of power and inequality, 
we then outline a normative and dynamic intergroup approach to social representations. 
What is shared in shared knowledge? 
Elcheroth et al. rightly point out the centrality of sharedness of knowledge in a social 
representational approach to political knowledge. Their perspective suggests that individuals elaborate 
common understandings of social reality which then enables them to communicate in order to take 
action on the basis of this shared knowledge. Elcheroth et al. readily admit that this point is hardly new 
or original. Many of the tenets of their approach can indeed be traced back to theories of the social 
self, in particular George Herbert Mead (1934) who understood individual conscience as a product of 
social relations. The second factor of social knowledge put forward by Elcheroth et al.—meta-
knowledge—can also be found in Mead’s work since his analysis of the self is based on the principle 
of reflexivity through which people come to have an understanding of themselves through the 
awareness of how other people see them, through the anticipation of others’ responses, and through 
normative expectations which make social coordination and ultimately social order possible. 
Overall, their view is strongly anchored in a self-other dichotomy which is illustrated by the 
fact that their arguments often refer to indiscriminate “others”, such as in “… our knowledge of the 
world is shared by others in communities of belief” (p. 7, our emphasis). Such a universalist 
conception of shared knowledge harks back to another Meadian concept: the “generalized other”. As 
in Elcheroth et al., Mead’s generalized other refers to significant and relevant, yet abstract members of 
reference communities, characterized by group-specific normative knowledge on which individuals 
rely to decide on behavioral options. Illustrating the centrality of this generic “other” in their analysis, 
the term “others” in this sense appears 32 times in their text, while “ingroup” (or “ingroups”) and 
“outgroup” or (“outgroups”) each appear only four times. 
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The indiscriminate use of “others” to refer to ingroup members suggests that it is 
unproblematic who these others actually are, and against whom they define themselves. From this 
view, it would follow that the issue of group boundaries between ingroup others and outgroup others is 
irrelevant, and that the contextual and perceived presence of others completely determines the 
psychological processes involved in the construction of political knowledge. Indeed, in many respects 
their text evokes the idea of close-knit communities in which members share, to varying degrees, 
common knowledge, norms and values. From our reading, then, this shared knowledge is rather 
consensually shared among members of some kind of generic ingroup. Debate, contestation, protest, 
radical disagreement are mentioned as important in their model, but surprisingly do not appear to play 
a major role in their interpretation of social representations. 
We would argue that a social representations approach has actually the potential to go a step 
further. Let us first clarify the conception of shared knowledge according to some of the classical 
works in social representations perspective (see Augoustinos, Walker & Donoghue, 2006; Bauer & 
Gaskell, 2008; Deaux & Philogène, 2001; Doise, Clémence & Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1993; Flick, 1995; 
Markova & Farr, 1995; Moscovici & Hewstone, 1983; Wagner & Hayes, 2005). In their discussion of 
social practices (p. 19), Elcheroth et al. briefly evoke two fundamental notions, objectification and 
anchoring. These concepts define two central processes in the construction of social representations. 
Objectification refers to the transformation of general or scientific ideas into concrete and useful forms 
of knowledge. This process produces shared figures or symbols which incorporate the meaning of the 
original ideas, but which can be more easily used in everyday communication. As stated by Elcheroth 
et al., this process is at work in collective remembering, institutionalization of routine practices or 
cultural stereotyping of minority groups. Such collective practices create a common memory for group 
members. Abraham Lincoln, for example, symbolizes the founding values of the USA for Americans 
(see Schwarz, 1990), while left-wing and right-wing orientations are used as concise categorizations of 
political ideas in Western societies. Such shared and common points of reference are necessary for 
meaningful communication. However, this does not mean that all group members would share the 
same knowledge. The objectified symbols must indeed be incorporated in established and familiar 
beliefs which in turn depend on the social group individuals belong to. Because social representations 
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are elaborated through discussion and debate, individuals anchor such common reference points in the 
normative perspectives of their own groups. Thus, liberals and conservatives appeal to Lincoln to 
promote contrasting ideas and policies in line with their party affiliation, and the definition of the 
left/right distinction varies according to political movements.  
Diversity, dualisms and social regulation 
While we do not deny the importance of such an ingroup dynamic, we feel it only tells part 
of the story. In particular, we think that the Elcheroth et al. view of social representations does not 
spell out how exactly their conception of shared knowledge can be linked to the issue of diversity, 
notwithstanding their statement that a social representational approach “better accounts for the 
negotiation of plurality, diversity, and innovation, which are all central to our contemporary ‘thinking 
societies’” (p. 27). In order to develop this point, we follow up their idea “that a critical aspect of 
social representations concerns the way we divide people into categories in the social world” (p. 10). 
Social representations theory emphasizes the importance of dualist principles at work in 
virtually any cognitive activity (Markova, 2006; Wagner & Hayes, 2005): antinomies between good 
and bad people, children and parents, friends and enemies, people high and low on the social ladder 
are but a few examples of antinomies where one everyday category is defined (and exists) only in 
relation to the other category. A dialectic view of human thinking view is also advocated by Billig 
(1989) who suggests that since human thinking is to a large extent an internal argumentation between 
antagonistic points of view, arguing (rather than thinking) should take center stage in analyses of 
social thought. We would therefore contend that at least one more factor should be added to the list of 
the four epistemological characteristics of social representations described by Elcheroth et al.: thinking 
in antinomies. Antinomic thinking is for example found in the context of ideological values. Both 
political and lay actors symbolize ideological values with antagonistic social categories which 
organize perceptions of minorities vs. majorities and of subordinate vs. dominant groups (Staerklé, 
2009). Self-control, for example, is objectified into an antagonism between groups perceived to be in 
control of themselves and groups perceived to be “out of control” such as drug addicts, obese or 
psychologically unstable people (Joffe & Staerklé, 2007). A normative categorization process thus 
creates and maintains antagonistic categories based on perceived conformity or transgression with 
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shared norms and values (see also Henry & Reyna, 2007; Kreindler, 2005). Similarly, the shared value 
of democracy is objectified with an antagonism between allegedly civilized democratic and allegedly 
uncivilized non-democratic populations (Staerklé, Clémence & Doise, 1998). We therefore suggest 
that antinomies are a key feature of social representations (Markova, 2006), in particular when they 
are objectified with antagonistic group relations. In political theory, such a view is advocated by 
Mouffe (1993) who suggests that the political process is all about regulating antagonistic intergroup 
relations.  
In order to account for social diversity, then, a social representations approach should 
analyze the multiple regulatory principles of social relations (that is, organizing principles) which 
orient the positioning of social actors towards important social issues (Doise et al., 1993; Doise & 
Staerklé, 2002; Elejabarrieta, 1994). Such a view should provide a conceptual framework through 
which stereotypes of ingroups and outgroups in diverse societies are seen as the product of antinomies 
which structure shared knowledge. The model of lay conceptions of social order (Staerklé, 2009; 
Staerklé, Delay, Gianettoni & Roux, 2007) outlines such an approach. This model defines four shared 
representations of fundamental intergroup antagonisms each of which is based on specific modes of 
social regulation: between “good” and “bad” people (based on conformity with common values), 
between “winners” and “losers” (based on meritocracy), between cultural and ethnic ingroups and 
outgroups (based on intergroup differentiation), and between dominant and subordinate groups (based 
on inequality management). This model evokes some of the classical social representations research 
which has studied how people differentiate themselves from threatening outgroups (Jodelet, 1991; 
Joffe, 1999). It provides a normative framework to study the multiple ways people are divided into 
social categories and to relate stereotype content of these categories to principles regulating social 
order. In line with social identity theory, this view also suggests that widely shared stereotypes derived 
from these antagonistic intergroup norms can be used as strategic tools which political actors draw 
upon to mobilize ingroups and to delegitimize outgroups (Reicher, 2004). 
Such an intergroup approach to political knowledge relates social groups to specific 
positions in debates about a given representational topic. Group members constantly refer to multiple 
and competing types of normative reference knowledge which define the terms of social debate, 
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contestation and protest. By taking up a position, they then either support or reject shared knowledge. 
Both everyday communication and political debate about diversity in democratic societies can thus be 
studied with such a framework. 
Power and inequality: Context or structure? 
Our focus on intergroup antagonisms is closely related to the notions of conflict, inequality 
and power which more often than not characterize relations between groups. As the authors rightly 
point out, “any theory about social representations is fundamentally a theory of social conflict” (p. 27, 
emphasis in original). While in one instance they link the principle of conflict to “conflicting versions 
of reality” people are exposed to (p.27), in most other occurrences, and notably in the case of ex-
Yugoslavia used to illustrate their model, the term “conflict” is understood as detrimental hostility 
between groups. Since conflict has mostly negative connotations in their text, we found it somewhat 
unclear why conflict would be so central in a social representations approach. 
Although Elcheroth et al. look at social representations as a “theory of power” and analyze 
“how power works”, their conception of power seems restricted to communication processes and 
mobilizing functions of representations. To be sure, this is important and gives a fresh look at power 
processes which dynamically appeal to representations and identities. At the same time, it seems a 
rather “thin” theory of power which ignores the existence of structural power relationships. While the 
authors briefly mention the existence of status inequalities (p. 29), it remains vague how exactly 
representations are connected to existing power structures and asymmetrical intergroup relations (see 
Jackman, 1984). Claiming that it is “certainly not self-evident who is dominant and who is 
subordinate” even seems to be at odds with ample sociological (e.g., Bourdieu, 1984) and historical 
(e.g., Horowitz, 2000) evidence which documents the existence of relationships of power and 
oppression between dominant and subordinate groups, be it in terms of class, race, gender or any other 
categorical criteria. We therefore find it somewhat misleading to oppose “essentialising” conceptions 
of power which take social hierarchies as a “fixed background” (p. 28) to a representational approach 
to power which is characterized by constant negotiation and communication and contextual definitions 
of ingroups and outgroups. For to consider the existence of structural power relationships does not 
necessarily imply essentialisation of these relationships. Intergroup domination and asymmetry are 
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empirical facts, and social inequalities, oppression and exploitation are part of a social reality the 
existence of which does not depend on interpretative activities of individuals. But we agree with 
Elcheroth et al. that the way individuals react to and cope with these power relationships depends on 
the meaning they assign to these power relationships and to the construction of common identities 
derived from these asymmetrical intergroup relationships. This intertwining of status and 
psychological process is illustrated by research which shows that status inequalities shape the sense of 
self. Membership in high status groups promotes access to normative and ideological representations 
of the self as autonomous and bounded individuals, whereas membership in subordinate groups gives 
rise to a more communal and collective understanding of the self (Deschamps, 1982). In this 
normative view, identities are grounded in existing power relations between social groups and in the 
representations which sustain them (Lorenzi-Cioldi & Clémence, 2001). 
Conflict and the dynamic intergroup approach to social representations 
More generally, what should be highlighted is the idea that conflict—between individuals 
and between groups—can also be constructive, and that conflict is indeed indispensable for social and 
political change. This is not only true for the development of individual cognitive competencies (Doise 
& Mugny, 1984), but also for wider social processes operating on a societal scale where minorities and 
majorities interact with each other. While the Elcheroth et al. paper seems to be closer to a social 
identity view where social influence is mainly located within groups (since group identification 
promotes conformity with ingroup norms),  a social representational view accounts for social change 
by considering influence to operate also at the intergroup level (Doise, 1993; Howarth, 2006).  
This brings us to the final point of this commentary which underscores the dynamic nature 
of the representational process (see also Moghaddam, 2006). Importantly, Elcheroth et al. (p. 5) 
introduce the three modalities of communication analyzed by Moscovici in 1961—diffusion, 
propagation and propaganda—on the basis of which Moscovici (1976) later developed his theory of 
social influence. When new ideas or unexpected events (e.g., AIDS, natural catastrophes, killings, or 
the Lewinski case) emerge in the public sphere, a phase of diffusion of information can be observed 
first. This phase occurs in a context of relative non-differentiation between actors and produces a 
network of common points of reference. In this process, media with a large audience contribute to the 
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circulation of various thematic elements and multiple opinions. This first phase follows a typical 
dynamic of objectification which gives rise to new norms resulting from the common influence 
exerted by different sources of communication. The second phase begins when powerful majority 
groups intervene in the debate and organize the information according to their norms and values. The 
message is directed towards individuals who look for cues which would help them to take up a 
position in the developing debate. Experts of the majority group may for example propagate priorities 
of the different elements of the new network of knowledge in order to consolidate well-established 
norms of the group. This is the typical majority influence phase in which majority group leaders can 
often easily orient opinions of their group members by integrating the new and unfamiliar information 
in the consensual beliefs of their groups. For minorities and subordinate groups, however, it is more 
difficult to make their claims heard. This is why their members have to adopt a more forceful 
perspective with a propaganda strategy which separates “true” from common knowledge. If the 
positions put forward in the propagation phase are expressed as flexible attitudes, those in the 
propaganda dynamic appear as firm and stereotypical. As Elcheroth and colleagues also point out, this 
is the typical form of minority influence in Moscovici’s conversion theory (1976): Minority groups 
propose an alternative point of view on a given issue and thereby enter a confrontational relation with 
the majority group in order to achieve social change (Butera & Levine, 2009; Moscovici, Mugny, & 
van Avermaet, 1985).  
In this dynamic approach, social stability and social change is viewed as a communicative 
process of social influence between minorities and majorities (Duveen, 2001). Social stability is 
maintained through a system of mutual processes of social influence which sustain particular forms of 
social representations. Majorities strive to maintain their dominant position by resisting minority 
influence, for example through delegitimizing minorities and the alternative points of view they put 
forward. If majorities successfully resist the influence attempts, the network of social influence is 
stable, representations become emancipated and normalized, and existing social arrangements are 
maintained. The balance of influence processes shifts, however, through the active influence attempts 
by minorities, or, in terms of social identity theory, through collective action (Reicher, 2004).  
Conclusion 
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Elcheroth and colleagues emphasize the differences or even the opposition of their 
perspective with a social cognitive approach deemed to be the dominant paradigm in studies of political 
knowledge (see Bar-Tal, 2002). From our side we would rather suggest that more integration is needed. 
Prior integrative work (Augustinos et al., 2006) has indeed shown that social representations and social 
cognition had much in common. There is for example a clear correspondence between the sharedness of 
representations and false consensus processes (Ross, Greene & House, 1977; Fields & Schuman, 1976), 
or between social anchoring processes in social representations and “hot” cognition processes as those 
theorized in political reasoning (e.g., Lodge & Taber, 2000). The paper by Elcheroth et al. appears to 
share with this social cognition approach the idea that political actors should first of all be understood 
as individuals located within groups. As a complement to this view, we have argued here that the social 
representations approach fundamentally adds an (asymmetrical) intergroup communication and 
intergroup influence theory to political psychology. In this view, and in line with Elcheroth and 
colleagues, political actors cannot be understood in isolation from their social contexts. But in addition 
they can neither be understood independently of the hierarchical intergroup systems in which they take 
part and towards which they have to position themselves (see Doise 1993, Rubin & Hewstone, 2004; 
Spini, Elcheroth & Fasel, 2008).  
The theoretical nature of the article by Elcheroth et al. should not give the impression that a 
social representations approach is necessarily conceptual and abstract. There is indeed a strong 
tradition of empirical research on social representations in many European and Latin American 
countries to which the authors only partially refer to. Instead, they ask to “be judged by the usefulness 
of the constructs” they provide rather than by their “faithfulness to a tradition” (p.11). Our guess is 
that constructs like social representations or social identity derived from grand European theories are 
indeed very useful to frame our empirical work in a paradigmatic view. At the same time, this 
usefulness can be further enhanced when the concepts are contextualized in relation to particular 
political phenomena, historical periods and cultural communities and then translated into testable 
models. More work needs to be done to gain a better understanding of the social dynamics which tie 
together social representations, intergroup relations and the structural features of diversity and 
inequality.
A normative and dynamic approach 10
 
References 
Augoustinos, M., Walker, I., & Donaghue, N. (2006). Social Cognition: An Integrated Introduction 
(2nd edn). London: Sage. 
Bar-Tal, D. (2002). The (social) psychological legacy for political psychology. In K. R. Monroe (Ed.), 
Political psychology (pp. 173-191). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Bauer, M.W., & Gaskell, G. (2008). Social representations theory: A progressive research programme 
for social psychology. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 38, 335 - 353. 
Billig, M. (1989). Ideological Dilemmas: A social psychology of everyday dilemmas. London: Sage. 
Bourdieu, P. (1984). Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste (R. Nice, Trans.). 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (Original edition: 1979). 
Butera, F. & Levine, J. M. (2009, Eds). Coping with minority status. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Deaux, K., & Philogène, G. (2001, Eds). Representations of the social. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. 
Deschamps, J.-C. (1982). Social identity and relations of power between groups. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), 
Social Identity and Intergroup Relations (pp. 85-98). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Doise, W. (1993). Debating social representations. In G. M. Breakwell & D. V. Canter (Eds.), 
Empirical Approaches to Social Representations (pp. 157-170). London: Academic Press/Surrey 
University Press. 
Doise, W., & Mugny, G. (1984). The social development of the intellect. International Series in 
Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 10. Oxford: Pergamon Press. 
Doise, W., & Staerklé, C. (2002). From social to political psychology: The societal approach. In K. 
Monroe (Ed.), Political psychology (pp. 151-172).  Hillsdale, NJ : Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Doise, W., Clémence, A., & Lorenzi-Cioldi, F. (1993). The quantitative analysis of social 
representations. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.  
A normative and dynamic approach 11
Duveen, G. (2001). Representations, identities, resistance. In K. Deaux and G. Philogène (Eds.), 
Representations of the social (pp. 257-270). Oxford, UK : Blackwell. 
Elejabarrieta, F. (1994). Social positioning: A way to link social representations and social identity. 
Social Science Information, 33, 241–253. 
Fields, J.M., & and Schuman, H. (1976). Public beliefs about the beliefs of the public. Public Opinion 
Quarterly, 40, 427-448. 
Flick, U. (1995). Social representations. In J. Smith, R. Harré, & L. Langenbore (Eds.), Rethinking 
psychology (pp. 70-96). London: Sage. 
Henry, P.J., & Reyna, C. (2007). Value judgments: The impact of perceived value violations on 
political attitudes. Political Psychology, 28, 273-298. 
Horowitz, D. (2000). Ethnic groups in conflict (2nd ed.). Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Howarth, C. (2006). A social representation is not a quiet thing: Exploring the critical potential of 
social representations theory. British Journal of Social Psychology, 45, 65-86. 
Jackman, M. (1994). The Velvet Glove: Paternalism and conflict in gender, class, and race relations. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Jodelet, D. (1991). Madness and social representations. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Joffe, H. (1999). Risk and the other. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Joffe, H., & Staerklé, C. (2007). The centrality of the self-control ethos in Western aspersions 
regarding outgroups: A social representational analysis of common stereotype content. Culture and 
Psychology, 13, 395-418. 
Kreindler, S.A., (2005). A dual group processes model of individual differences in prejudice. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 9, 90-107. 
Lodge, M. & Taber, C. S. (2000). Three steps toward a theory of motivated political reasoning. In A. 
Lupia, M. McCubbins, & S. Popkin (Eds.), Elements of reason: Cognition, choice, and the bounds 
of rationality (pp. 183–213). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
A normative and dynamic approach 12
Lorenzi-Cioldi, F. & Clémence, A. (2001). Group processes and the construction of social 
representations. In M.A. Hogg & S. Tindale (Eds), Blackwell handbook of social psychology : 
Group processes (pp. 311–333). Oxford : Blackwell. 
Markova, I. (2006). Dialogicality and social representations. The dynamics of mind. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Markova, I., & Farr, R. (1995). Representations of health, illness and handicap. Chur, Switzerland: 
Harwood. 
Mead, G.H. (1934). Mind, self and society from the standpoint of a social behaviourist. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Moghaddam, F.M. (2006). Interobjectivity: The collective roots of individual consciousness and social 
identity. In T. Postmes & J. Jetten (Eds.), Individuality and the group: Advances in social identity 
(pp. 155–174). London: Sage. 
Moscovici, S. (1976). Social influence and social change. London: Academic Press. 
Moscovici, S., & Hewstone, M. (1983). Social representations and social explanations: From the 
'naïve' to the 'amateur' scientist. In M. Hewstone (Ed.), Attribution theory: Social and functional 
extensions (pp. 98-125). Oxford, UK: Blackwell. 
Moscovici, S., Mugny, G., & van Avermaet (1985). Perspectives on minority influence. New York: 
Cambrige University Press.  
Mouffe, C. (1993). The return of the Political. London : Verso. 
Reicher, S. (2004). The context of social identity: Domination, resistance, and change. Political 
Psychology, 25, 921-945. 
Ross L., Greene D. & House, P. (1977). The false consensus effect: An egocentric bias in social 
perception and attribution processes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 13, 279-301. 
Rubin, M., & Hewstone, M. (2004). Social identity, system justification, and social dominance: 
Commentary on Reicher, Jost and Banaji, and Sidanius et al. Political Psychology, 25, 823-844. 
A normative and dynamic approach 13
Schwarz, B. (1990). The reconstruction of Abraham Lincoln. In D. Middleton & D. Edwards (Eds), 
Collective remembering (pp. 81-107). London: Sage, pp. 81-107. . 
Spini, D., Elcheroth, G., & Fasel, R. (2008). The impact of group norms and generalization of risks on 
judgments of war behavior. Political Psychology, 29(6), 919-941. 
Staerklé, C. (2009). Policy attitudes, ideological values and social representations. Social and 
Personality Psychology Compass, 3, 1096-1112. 
Staerklé, C., Clémence, A., & Doise, W. (1998). Representation of human rights across different 
national contexts: The role of democratic and non-democratic populations and governments. 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 28, 207-226. 
Staerklé, C., Delay, C., Gianettoni, L., & Roux, P. (2007). Qui a droit à quoi ? Représentations et 
légitimation de l’ordre social. [Who is entitled to what? Representations and legitimation of social 
order]. Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble. 
Wagner, W., & Hayes, N. (2005). Everyday discourse and common sense. The theory of social 
representations. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
